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Secret Securing with Multiple Protections and Minimum Costs
Shoma Matsui and Kai Cai
Abstract—In this paper we study a security problem of
protecting secrets with multiple protections and minimum costs.
The target system is modeled as a discrete-event system (DES)
in which a few states are secrets, and there are multiple subsets
of protectable events with different cost levels. We formulate
the problem as to ensure that every string that reaches a secret
state (from the initial state) contains a specified number of
protectable events and the highest cost level of these events is
minimum. We first provide a necessary and sufficient condition
under which this security problem is solvable, and then propose
an algorithm to solve the problem based on the supervisory
control theory of DES. The resulting solution is a protection
policy which specifies at each state which events to protect and
the highest cost level of protecting these events is minimum.
Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our solution with
a network security example.
I. INTRODUCTION
Various security problems called cybersecurity issues have
attracted much interest of researchers. In real systems, se-
curity problems can be caused by administrators’ mistakes
or vulnerabilities of products. [1] introduces practical and
technical methods relevant to security issues in the real
world. In general, there are some secrets in the system
which intruders want to steal without raising an alert, namely
without being detected, and such secrets must be protected
against malicious access of intruders. At the same time, the
cost to protect secrets must be taken into account because
infinite protection cost is infeasible in practice.
In this paper, we employ discrete-event systems (DES)
to model real systems because it is suitable for describing
dynamics and architectures of computer and network sys-
tems [2]. We also utilize the fundamental techniques from
the supervisory control theory (SCT) of DES to compute
solutions for problems we introduce. The SCT is the theory
that Ramadge and Wonham originally proposed in [3]. For
a comprehensive account of the SCT, the reader is referred
to [4], and also see [5] for a historical overview of the theory.
One aspect of anonymity and secrecy that has been exten-
sively studied in DES is opacity. This is a concept that in-
truders cannot identify secrets in the system because of their
partial observability. For an overview of opacity, the reader
is referred to [6], and also see [7] for historical remarks on
opacity. In case that opacity is violated, several methods of
enforcing opacity have been explored in literature [8], [9].
[8] investigates making languages that the system generates
opaque, namely intruders cannot determine that the system
has generated a secret language, by controlling the system
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with the SCT. [9] introduces inserting observable events into
output languages from the system to make the language
which intruders observe opaque. Opacity is based on the side
of intruders, assuming that they have full knowledge of the
target system’s structure but have only partial observability
of the system’s behavior. By contrast, our work in this paper
stands on the side of system administrators and focuses on
the secret protection. We do not impose assumptions on
the intruders’ knowledge and observability of the system.
In particular, intruders may be able to observe all events,
in which case opacity cannot hold. Instead, we study the
problem of protecting the secrets as much as possible, while
balanced by the cost of such protections.
For protecting secrets, we consider that there exist some
operations or events which can be protected by admin-
istrators, e.g. connecting to a network or logging into a
computer. In this paper, we represent an event to which
system managers can apply a protection as a protectable
event, and other events as unprotectable events. We also
consider that there are multiple groups of protectable events,
which have different levels of protection implementation
costs. In addition, we represent secret information to be
protected in the system as secret states. Secret information is
a particular piece of information which should be available
only to permitted users, for example, users’ credit card
numbers, or system privileges like root in Unix operating
systems. System administrators decide which protectable
events to apply protections based on a protection policy
that specifies which events to be protected at a given state.
Our main objective is to solve the problem of finding an
effective protection policy such that all secrets are protected
with a predetermined number of protections, and the highest
cost level to implement these protections is minimum. To
compute a solution for this security problem, we convert the
problem into a control problem and resort to the SCT. Our
previous work [10] introduces a problem of secret securing
with at least one protection and minimum protection cost,
which is a special case of the problem considered in this
paper.
The main contributions of this paper are fourfold. First, we
formalize the security problem with DES as secret protection
with multiple protections and minimum costs. Second, we
present a necessary and sufficient condition under which
the problem is solvable. This condition characterizes the
situation where every string leading to the secret states in the
system has at least a specified number of protectable events.
Third, we introduce the concept conversion from security to
control, and propose an algorithm to compute a solution for
the converted and the original problem.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II introduces a target system modeled by DES and
formulates the problem of secret securing with multiple
protections and minimum costs. In Section III, we first intro-
duce a solvability condition such that the formulated original
problem is solvable, and convert the security problem to a
control problem, and then propose an algorithm to compute a
solution for the converted problem. Section IV demonstrates
our algorithm with an illustrating example.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate “Secret Securing with Multi-
ple Protections and Minimum Costs Problem”. Its objective
is to find a policy to protect all secret states with a prescribed
number of protections and minimum protection cost. Con-
sider a task to protect all secrets in the system, and assume
that administrators want to use at least m (≥ 1) protections.
For this task, we need to find a protection policy to force
intruders before reaching secrets to encounter m protections.
Meanwhile, the protection cost must be minimum. We con-
sider that all secrets are protected with m protections when
every string reaching secrets from the initial state has at least
m protectable events.
We consider secret securing with minimum costs problem
(SSMCP) in the framework of discrete-event systems (DES)
modeled as finite-state automata
G := (Q,Σ, δ, q0) (1)
where Q is the set of states, Σ is the set of all events,
δ : Q×Σ→ Q is the partial transition function, and q0 ∈ Q
is the initial state. We denote by Qs ⊆ Q the set of secret
states in G. δ is extended to δ : Q×Σ∗ → Q in the standard
manner [2]. δ(q, s)! denotes that string s from state q is
defined. Σ is a disjoint union of the protectable event set Σp
and the unprotectable event set Σup, namely Σ = Σp ∪˙Σup.
In addition, Σp is partitioned into n disjoint subsets of
protectable events Σi where i ∈ { 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 }, namely
Σp =
⋃˙n−1
i=0 Σi. The index i of Σi indicates the level of
protection cost when the system administrator protects events
in Σi. As the index i increases, the protection cost becomes
higher. We consider that the cost level of each subset is not
comparable with other subsets. In other words, the cost to
protect one event in Σi is sufficiently higher than the cost
to protect all events in Σi−1. For example, implementing
a biometric protection is often more costly than setting up
multiple password protections. We also denote the union of
the subsets of protectable events until index k by Σkp =⋃˙k
i=0 Σi.
In order to identify which transitions to protect, the sys-
tem administrator needs a protection policy which specifies
protectable events at suitable states. We define such a policy
as a function P : Q → Pwr(Σp) where Pwr(Σp) is the
power set of Σp. For example, P(q) = { σi, σj } indicates
that protectable events σi and σj are protected at state q.
For clarity of presentation, we henceforth focus on the case
m = 2. The casem ≥ 3 can be addressed in the same fashion
(but with more complicated notation). The case m = 1 has
been solved in [10], which is a special case of the problem
addressed in this paper. We first define the following concept
indicating that the secret states are protected with at least two
protections.
Definition 1 (2-secure reachability). Consider a plant G in
(1). The secret state Qs is securely reachable with at least
two protectable events (2-securely reachable) w.r.t. G and
Σkp =
⋃˙k
i=0 Σi if the following condition holds:
[∀s ∈ Σ∗]δ(q0, s)! & δ(q0, s) ∈ Qs =⇒ s ∈ Σ
∗ΣkpΣ
∗ΣkpΣ
∗
(2)
Note that s in (2) can contain two or more protectable
events in Σkp , which means that intruders have to penetrate
at least two protections to reach secrets. When condition (2)
does not hold, there exists a string which contains one or
no protected event and reaches a secret state – this is the
situation we try to avoid.
Next, we formulate the following security problem with
Definition 1.
Problem 2 (Secret Securing with Two Protections and
Minimum Costs Problem, or 2-SSMCP). Consider a plant
G in (1). Find a protection policy P : Q → Pwr(Σp) s.t.
Qs is 2-securely reachable w.r.t. Σ
k
p =
⋃˙k
i=0 Σi and k is the
least index.
Let us explain Problem 2 with an illustrating example of
a real system.
q0 q1
q2 q3
q4 q5
σ0
σ1
σ2
σ3
σ4
σ5
σ6 σ7
σ8
σ9 σ10
Fig. 1. Plant G
Example 3. The plantG in Fig. 1 represents a computer net-
work composed of two different local-area networks (LAN)
and two servers. Consider a situation where a user uses a
laptop and wants to browse his or her secret file in the server
via Wi-Fi. q0 means “the client is not connected”, and q1 is a
wireless router. Accordingly, σ0 and σ1 indicate connecting
to and disconnecting from the router. q2 and q4 represent
being in the respective LAN, that is, the client has been
assigned an IP address. σ2, σ3, σ8, and σ9 are operations of
connecting to and disconnecting from networks q2 and q4.
q5 is the server where the client’s secret file is stored. q3 is
a bastion server different from q5, which allows clients to
access to q5 through q3, namely σ7. Accordingly, σ4 and σ5
are logging on to and logging out from q3. Users in LANs q2
and q4 can access to q5 directly. In order to protect the secret
file against malicious access of intruders, the administrators
must protect some suitable events in the plant, and they wish
to do so with minimum cost.
Let Σp = Σ0 ∪˙Σ1 ∪˙Σ2 be the set of protectable events,
where Σ0 = { σ0 }, Σ1 = { σ4, σ6, σ10 }, Σ2 = { σ2, σ8 }.
Also let Σup = { σ1, σ3, σ5, σ7, σ9 } be the set of unpro-
tectable events, and Σ = Σp ∪˙Σup. The secret state q5
is depicted as a shaded state in Fig. 1; thus Qs = { q5 }.
The 2-SSMCP is the problem of finding a protection policy
which specifies at least two protectable events in every path
from q0 to q5 with minimum protection cost. In other words,
every string reaching q5 from q0 must have at least two
protectable events, and the index k ∈ { 0, 1, 2} of Σkp of
these protectable events must be the smallest.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we provide a necessary and sufficient
condition for the solvability of Problem 2, and compute a
solution by resorting to the SCT.
A. Solvability of 2-SSMCP
The following theorem provides a necessary and sufficient
condition under which there exists a solution of Problem 2.
Theorem 4. Consider a plantG in (1). Problem 2 is solvable
w.r.t. G and Σkp =
⋃˙k
i=0 Σi iff either
Qs is 2-securely reachable w.r.t. G and Σ0 (3)
or [
Qs is 2-securely reachable w.r.t. G and Σ
k
p &
Qs is not 2-securely reachable w.r.t. G and Σ
k−1
p
] (4)
holds.
Condition (3) means that when k = 0, secret states in
Qs can be protected with at least two protections using
protectable events in Σ0p = Σ0. The meaning of (4) is that
when 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1, secret states in Qs can be protected with
at least two protections using protectable events in Σkp , and
secrets can be protected with only one protection or cannot
be protected using protectable events only in Σk−1p .
Proof. (⇒) If (3) is true, then Qs is 2-securely reachable
w.r.t. Σ0p = Σ0 (i.e. k = 0). The index k of Σ
k
p cannot
be smaller than 0, namely k is minimum. In this case, there
exists a protection policy P as a solution for Problem 2 using
protectable events only in Σ0. Therefore, if (3) holds, then
Problem 2 is solvable. Next, if (4) is true, then Qs is 2-
securely reachable w.r.t. Σkp, and k is the least index because
Qs is not 2-securely reachable w.r.t. Σ
k−1
p and Σ
k−1
p ⊆ Σ
k
p .
In this case, there exists a protection policy P as a solution
for Problem 2 using protectable events in Σkp . Therefore, if
(4) holds, then Problem 2 is solvable.
(⇐) If Problem 2 is solvable when k = 0, then Qs is 2-
securely reachable w.r.t. Σ0. This is equivalent to (3). Thus
if Problem 2 is solvable when k = 0, then (3) holds. Next,
if Problem 2 is solvable when 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, then Qs is 2-
securely reachable w.r.t. Σkp , and since k is minimum, Qs is
not 2-securely reachable w.r.t. Σk−1p because of Σ
k−1
p ⊆ Σ
k
p .
Therefore, if Problem 2 is solvable when 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1,
then (4) holds.
B. Policy Computation
In this subsection, we compute a protection policy when
the solvability condition of Problem 2 in Theorem 4 holds.
To compute a protection policy, we convert the security
problem (Problem 2) to a control problem and resort to the
SCT. An overview of our concept conversions is shown
Security Problem
Control Problem Control Policy
Protection Policy
Supervisory Control
Fig. 2. Conversion overview
in Fig. 2. By the conversion, protectable events Σp and
unprotectable events Σup are converted to controllable events
Σc and uncontrollable events Σuc respectively. Accordingly,
given a plant G, (1) becomes
G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0) (5)
where Σ = Σc ∪˙Σuc, and Σc =
⋃˙n−1
i=0 Σi. Recall that Σi,
i ∈ { 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 }, denotes the partition of protectable
events, indicating the cost level with the index i. As Σkp , we
denote the union of the subsets of controllable events until
index k by Σkc =
⋃˙k
i=0 Σi. Note that by the conversion,
protection policy P is converted to control policy D :
Q → Pwr(Σc) which is the supervisor’s decision of which
controllable events to disable at any given state. Letting
S = (X,Σ, ξ, x0) be a supervisor which is a subautomaton
of the plant G, D is given by
D(q) :=
{
{ σ ∈ Σc | ¬ξ(q, σ)! & δ(q, σ)! } if q ∈ X
∅ if q ∈ Q \X
(6)
Based on the above conversion, the following definition
and problem are converted from Definition 1 and Problem 2.
Definition 5 (2-controllable reachability). Consider a plant
G in (5). The secret state set Qs is controllably reachable
with at least two controllable events (2-controllably reach-
able) w.r.t. G and Σkc =
⋃˙k
i=0 Σi if the following condition
holds:
[∀s ∈ Σ∗]δ(q0, s)! & δ(q0, s) ∈ Qs =⇒ s ∈ Σ
∗ΣkcΣ
∗ΣkcΣ
∗
(7)
Problem 6 (Reachability Control with Two Controllable
Events and Minimum Costs Problem, or 2-RCMCP). Con-
sider a plant G in (5). Find a control policy D s.t. Qs is
2-controllably reachable w.r.t. Σkc and k is the least index.
Next, the following is a necessary and sufficient condition
under which Problem 6 is solvable.
Proposition 7. Consider a plant G in (5). Problem 6 is
solvable iff either
Qs is 2-controllably reachable w.r.t. G and Σ0 (8)
or [
Qs is 2-controllably reachable w.r.t. G and Σ
k
c &
Qs is not 2-controllably reachable w.r.t. G and Σ
k−1
c
]
(9)
holds.
Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 4 and the conver-
sion.
Problem 8 (Reachability Control with One Controllable
Event and Minimum Cost Problem, or 1-RCMCP). Consider
a plant G in (5). Find a control policy D s.t. Qs is
controllably reachable with at least one controllable event
w.r.t. Σkc and k is the least index.
The following relation holds between Problem 8 and
Problem 6.
Proposition 9. Problem 8 is solvable if Problem 6 is solv-
able.
Proof. Problem 8 is solvable iff either
[∀s ∈ (Σ \ Σ0)
∗]δ(q0, s) 6∈ Qs (10)
or [
[∀s ∈ (Σ \ Σkc )
∗]δ(q0, s) 6∈ Qs∧
[∃s ∈ (Σ \ Σk−1c )
∗]δ(q0, s) ∈ Qs
] (11)
holds (cf. [10]). (10) is equivalent to
[∀s ∈ Σ∗]δ(q0, s)! & δ(q0, s) ∈ Qs =⇒ s ∈ Σ
∗Σ0Σ
∗ (12)
and (11) is equivalent to
[∀s ∈ Σ∗]δ(q0, s)! & δ(q0, s) ∈ Qs =⇒ s ∈ Σ
∗ΣkcΣ
∗
&
[∃s ∈ Σ∗]δ(q0, s)! & δ(q0, s) ∈ Qs& s 6∈ Σ
∗Σk−1c Σ
∗
(13)
Moreover from Definition 5, (8) is equivalent to
[∀s ∈ Σ∗]δ(q0, s)! & δ(q0, s) ∈ Qs =⇒ s ∈ Σ
∗Σ0Σ
∗Σ0Σ
∗
(14)
and (9) is equivalent to
[∀s ∈ Σ∗]δ(q0, s)! & δ(q0, s) ∈ Qs =⇒ s ∈ Σ
∗ΣkcΣ
∗ΣkcΣ
∗
&
[∃s ∈ Σ∗]δ(q0, s)! & δ(q0, s) ∈ Qs & s 6∈ Σ
∗Σk−1c Σ
∗Σk−1c Σ
∗
(15)
From Proposition 7, if Problem 6 is solvable when k = 0,
then (14) is true. Thus from Σ∗Σ0Σ
∗Σ0Σ
∗ ⊆ Σ∗Σ0Σ
∗, (12)
is also true. Thus from (10), when k = 0, Problem 8 is
solvable if Problem 6 is solvable. In the same way, when
1 ≤ k ≤ n−1, Problem 8 is solvable if Problem 6 is solvable
from (11), (13), and (15).
To compute a control policy which specifies at least two
controllable events in every string reaching secret states from
the initial state, we propose Algorithm 1. This algorithm
computes two supervisors S0 and S1 for G in (5). Each
supervisor provides a different control policy such that every
string reaching secret states has at least one controllable
event with minimum cost. To compute the first supervisor
S0, we design the control specification GK by removing the
secret states in Qs and the transitions to and from removed
secret states:
GK = (Q \Qs,Σ, δK , q0) (16)
where δK = δ \ { (q, σ, q
′) | q, q′ ∈ Qs, σ ∈ Σ }.
Note that in real systems, secret states are still reachable.
It is not suitable to disable events to protect secrets because
it can inhibit users’ normal behavior.
Algorithm 1 RCMC2
Input: G in (5), GK in (16)
Output: Supervisor automata S0 and S1
1: Compute S0, k0 by RCMC1 with inputs G, GK
2: if S0 is nonempty then
3: Derive D0 from S0 by (6)
4: Form G1 = (Q,Σ
1, δ1, q0) as in (18)
5: δ1K = δ
1 \ { (q, σ, q′) | q, q′ ∈ Qs, σ ∈ Σ
1 }
6: GK1 = (Q \Qs,Σ
1, δ1K , q0)
7: Compute S1, k1 by RCMC1 with inputs G1, GK1
8: return S0, S1
9: end if
10: return Empty supervisors
11:
12: function RCMC1(G, GK)
13: K = L(GK)
14: for k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 do
15: Σkc =
k⋃˙
i=0
Σi
16: Compute a supervisor S s.t. L(S) = supC(K)
w.r.t. Σkc
17: if S is nonempty then
18: return S, k
19: end if
20: end for
21: return Empty supervisor, null
22: end function
Example 10. The specification automaton for the plant
in Example 3 is shown in Fig. 3. From (16), secret state
Qs = { q5 } and transitions (q2, σ6, q5), (q3, σ7, q5), and
(q4, σ10, q5) are removed from the plant G in Fig. 1.
To proceed, we need several standard concepts of the SCT.
Consider a plant G in (5). Let K = L(GK) ⊆ L(G) be a
specification language. From [4],K is controllable ifKΣuc∩
q0 q1
q2 q3
q4
σ0
σ1
σ2
σ3
σ4
σ5
σ8
σ9
Fig. 3. Specification GK
L(G) ⊆ K where K is the prefix closure of K . The family
C(K) is the set of all controllable sublanguages of K , and
denoted by C(K) := {K ′ ⊆ K | K ′Σuc ∩ L(G) ⊆ K ′ }.
The supremal controllable sublanguage of K is given by
supC(K) :=
⋃
{K ′ | K ′ ∈ C(K) }. supC(K) w.r.t. G
and Σkc means supC(K) =
⋃
{K ′′ | K ′′ ∈ C(K) } where
C(K) = {K ′ ⊆ K | K ′(Σ \ Σkc ) ∩ L(G) ⊆ K
′ }.
Lemma 11. (cf. [4]) LetG = (Q,Σuc ∪˙Σc, δ, q0) be a plant
and K ⊆ L(G) be a specification language. The following
holds:
supC(K) = ∅ ⇐⇒ [∃s ∈ Σ∗uc]s ∈ L(G) \K (17)
From Lemma 11 and the construction of GK in (16),
letting K = L(GK), the supervisor S0 = supC(K) w.r.t. G
in (5) and Σkc is nonempty if and only if every string which
contains events in Σkc in G and reaches secret states has at
least one controllable event. In other words, supC(K) 6= ∅
w.r.t. G and Σkc if and only if [∀s ∈ (Σ\Σ
k
c )
∗]δ(q0, s) 6∈ Qs.
Accordingly, the RCMC1 function in Algorithm 1 returns a
supervisor which specifies controllable events such that every
string reaching secret states from the initial state has at least
one controllable event. The index k which RCMC1 returns
is minimum because the index in RCMC1 starts from 0 and
is incremented by 1 at each iteration.
LetD0 be a control policy derived from the first supervisor
S0 as in (6). To compute the second supervisor S1, we
relabel the transitions specified by D0 to distinguish the
disabled transitions and other non-disabled transitions. Re-
labeled controllable transitions are treated as uncontrollable.
Accordingly, a new plant G1 is defined as follows:
G1 = (Q,Σ
1, δ1, q0) (18)
Σ1 = Σuc1 ∪˙ (Σc \ { σ ∈ Σ | (q, σ, q
′) ∈ δD0 }) (19)
Σuc1 = Σuc ∪˙ { σ ∈ Σ | (q, σ
′, q′) ∈ δ′
D0
} (20)
δD0 = { (q, σ, q
′) | q, q′ ∈ Q, σ ∈ D0(q) } (21)
δ′
D0
= { (q, σ′, q′) | q, q′ ∈ Q, σ ∈ D0(q) } (22)
δ1 = (δ \ δD0) ∪˙ δ
′
D0
(23)
Note that Σuc1 is the subset of uncontrollable events in G1.
We call the sequence from (18) to (23) that defines G1
“relabeling”.
Example 12. Consider the plant G in Example 3. The
control policy D0 derived from the first supervisor for
Example 3 is as follows:
D0(q0) = { σ0 }
D0(q1) = D0(q2) = D0(q3) = ∅
D0(q4) = D0(q4) = D0(q5) = ∅
(24)
The protection policy P0 derived fromD0 by the conversion
q0 q1
q2 q3
q4 q5
σ0
µ
σ1
σ2
σ3
σ4
σ5
σ6 σ7
σ8
σ9 σ10
Fig. 4. The plant G with the protection policy P0
is shown in Fig. 4. “µ” means that the event is protected.
Before we compute the second supervisor to obtain a solu-
tion for Problem 6, we relabel the disabled transitions D0
specifies as follows:
δ′D0 = { (q0, σ
′
0, q1) } (25)
Based on this relabeling, a new plant G1 = (Q,Σ
1, δ1, q0)
q0 q1
q2 q3
q4 q5
σ′0
σ1
σ2
σ3
σ4
σ5
σ6 σ7
σ8
σ9 σ10
Fig. 5. Plant G1
derived from G in Fig. 1 is shown in Fig. 5.
Finally, letting δ1K = δ
1\{ (q, σ, q′) | q, q′ ∈ Qs, σ ∈ Σ
1 },
we design the specification automaton GK1 = (Q \
Qs,Σ
1, δ1K , q0) for the relabeled plant G1 to compute the
second supervisor S1. For Example 3, GK1 is depicted in
Fig. 6.
q0 q1
q2 q3
q4
σ′0
σ1
σ2
σ3
σ4
σ5
σ8
σ9
Fig. 6. Specification GK1
Algorithm 1 returns either empty or nonempty supervisor
automata S0 and S1. If Algorithm 1 returns two nonempty
supervisors, there exists a control policyD0 by the supervisor
S0 such that L(S0) = supC(L(GK)) and D1 by S1 such
that L(S1) = supC(L(GK1)). From D0 and D1, a solution
for Problem 6, namely D : Q→ Pwr(Σc), is given by
D(q) := D0(q) ∪˙D1(q) (26)
In other words, (26) means merging D0 and D1. Each
control policy specifies controllable events such that every
string reaching secrets has at least one controllable event.
Therefore,D in (26) specifies at least two controllable events
in every string reaching secret states from the initial state.
Index k1 in Algorithm 1 line 7 is equal to or larger than
k0 in line 1, namely k0 ≤ k1. This is because k0 is the
least index such that there exists a control policy D0 to
make secret states unreachable in G. Moreover, letting Σkc
be the subset of controllable events that D in (26) specifies
to disable, index k is minimum because k1 are minimum and
k = k1. Thus, the condition in Proposition 7 is satisfied with
k = k in (8) and (9).
Proposition 13. Algorithm 1 returns nonempty supervisors
iff Problem 6 is solvable.
Proof. (⇐) From Proposition 9, if Problem 6 is solvable,
then a supervisor S0 on line 2 of Algorithm 1 is nonempty.
Furthermore from Proposition 7, if Problem 6 is solvable,
then every string s ∈ Σ∗ s.t. δ(q0, s) ∈ Qs contains two
or more controllable events. Thus from the definition of
relabeling in (18)–(23), every string s ∈ Σ∗ s.t. δ1(q0, s) ∈
Qs has at least one controllable event. Therefore, there
exists an index k1 (where k0 ≤ k1 ≤ n − 1) of Σ
k1
c s.t.
supC(L(GK1)) 6= ∅ w.r.t.G1 and Σ
k1
c , and RCMC1 returns
a nonempty supervisor, namely S1 on line 7 of Algorithm 1
is nonempty. It follows from Algorithm 1 line 8 that the
nonempty supervisors S0 and S1 are returned, and index k1
is the least.
(⇒) When Algorithm 1 returns nonempty supervisors,
S0 and S1 in Algorithm 1 are nonempty. Thus from the
relabeling and RCMC1, if k0 = k1 = 0, each of D0 and
D1 specifies controllable events belonging to Σ0. Therefore,
letting k = k1 = 0, condition (8) is true. Hence from
Proposition 7, Problem 6 is solvable if Algorithm 1 returns
nonempty supervisors and k0 = k1 = 0. Likewise, when
0 ≤ k0 ≤ k1 ≤ n− 1 (27)
in Algorithm 1, letting k = k1, (9) is true because
Σk0c ⊆ Σ
k1
c . Hence from Proposition 7, Problem 6 is solvable
if Algorithm 1 returns nonempty supervisors and (27) is
true.
From (26), a solution for Problem 2, namely P : Q →
Pwr(Σp), is given by
P(q) := P0(q) ∪˙P1(q) (28)
where P0 and P1 are derived from D0 and D1 respectively
by inverse conversion. The least index is k = k1.
Finally, we state our main result.
Theorem 14. Consider a plant G in (1). If Problem 2 is
solvable, then the protection policy P in (28) is a solution
for Problem 2.
Proof. Suppose that Problem 2 is solvable. Then Problem 6
is solvable by conversion of protectable events to con-
trollable events. Then by Proposition 13, Algorithm 1 re-
turns nonempty supervisors S0 and S1 such that L(S0) =
supC(L(GK)) and L(S1) = supC(L(GK1)). Based on S0
and S1, control policies D0 and D1 can be defined as in
(6) respectively. Thus a merged control policy D can be
defined as in (26) from D0 and D1. From the relabeling,
D0 and D1 specify different transitions to disable. Also it
follows from GK and GK1 that Qs is controllably reachable
under each of D0 and D1. Therefore, under control policy
D, Qs is 2-controllably reachable. Moreover, letting k = k1
(where k1 is from line 7 of Algorithm 1) and Σ
k
c be the
subset of controllable events that D specifies, index k of Σkc
is minimum because k = k1 and k1 is minimum. Hence
the control policy D derived from D0 and D1 computed by
Algorithm 1 is a solution for Problem 6. Consequently from
the conversion, the protection policy P defined in (28) is a
solution for Problem 2.
C. Securing with Multiple Protections
When administrators need to protect secrets with strictly
more than two protections, 2-SSMCP (Problem 2) is ex-
tended to m (≥ 3) protections (m-SSMCP). To compute a
solution for m-SSMCP, we iterate the relabeling procedure
and the function RCMC1 in Algorithm 1 until secrets are
protected by m protections. Letting j be the execution
count of RCMC1, the relabeling procedure (18)–(23) is also
extended for m-SSMCP as follows:
Gj+1 = (Q,Σ
j+1, δj+1, q0) (29)
Σj+1 = Σucj+1 ∪˙ (Σc \ { σ ∈ Σ | (q, σ, q
′) ∈ δDj }) (30)
Σucj+1 = Σuc ∪˙ { σ ∈ Σ | (q, σ
′, q′) ∈ δ′
Dj
} (31)
δDj = { (q, σ, q
′) | q, q′ ∈ Q, σ ∈ Dj(q) } (32)
δ′
Dj
= { (q, σ′, q′) | q, q′ ∈ Q, σ ∈ Dj(q) } (33)
δj+1 = (δ \ δDj ) ∪˙ δ
′
Dj
(34)
Based on this extension, to compute a protection policy such
that every string reaching secrets has m protectable events,
we propose Algorithm 2 as an extension of Algorithm 1.
IV. ILLUSTRATING EXAMPLE
A. Two Protections
Let us take Example 3 again to demonstrate our developed
solution for 2-SSMCP.
Consider the plant G in Example 3. We first convert 2-
SSMCP (Problem 2) to 2-RCMCP (Problem 6) by convert-
ing protectable events to controllable events. In Algorithm 1
line 1, from Example 12, S0 is nonempty. In line 3, D0 is
in (24). In line 4, the new plant G1 derived from G and
D0 by the relabeling is in Fig. 5. In line 6, the specification
Algorithm 2 RCMCm
Input: G in (5), GK in (16), m
Output: Supervisor automata S0, S1, . . . , Sm−1
1: G0 = G,GK0 = GK
2: for j = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1 do
3: Compute Sj , kj by RCMC1 in Algorithm 1 with
inputs Gj , GKj
4: if Sj is nonempty then
5: Derive Dj from Sj by (6)
6: Form Gj+1 = (Q,Σ
j+1, δj+1, q0) from Gj and
Dj as in (29)
7: δ
j+1
K = δ
j+1\{ (q, σ, q′) | q, q′ ∈ Qs, σ ∈ Σ
j+1 }
8: GKj+1 = (Q \Qs,Σ
j+1, δ
j+1
K , q0)
9: else
10: return Empty supervisors
11: end if
12: end for
13: return S0, S1, . . . , Sm−1
automaton GK1 for G1 is shown in Fig. 6. Call function
RCMC1 at line 7. In line 13, let K = L(GK1). In line 14,
initially k = 0:
Σ0c = { σ0 }
Σ \ Σ0c = Σuc1 ∪˙Σ1 ∪˙Σ2
Then
C(K) = {∅ }
Hence
supC(K) = ∅
Thus increment k by 1, i.e. k = 1:
Σ1c = { σ0, σ4, σ6, σ10 }
Σ \ Σ1c = Σuc1 ∪˙Σ2
Then
C(K) = {∅, (σ′0(σ2.σ3)
∗(σ8.σ9)
∗σ1)
∗ }
Hence
supC(K) = (σ′0(σ2.σ3)
∗(σ8.σ9)
∗σ1)
∗
So in line 18, function RCMC1 returns S1 with L(S1) =
supC(K), and k = 1. Then, Algorithm 1 returns nonempty
supervisors S0 and S1. According to S1, a control policy D1
for G1 is as follows:
D1(q2) = { σ4, σ6 }
D1(q4) = { σ10 }
D1(q0) = D1(q1) = D1(q3) = D1(q5) = ∅
(35)
Therefore, the solution for Problem 6 for this example is the
following control policy D derived from (24) and (35) by
(26):
D(q0) = { σ0 }
D(q2) = { σ4, σ6 }
D(q4) = { σ10 }
D(q1) = D(q3) = D(q5) = ∅
(36)
Finally, the solution for Problem 2 (i.e. the protection
policy P) for this example is derived from (36) by the reverse
conversion:
P(q0) = { σ0 }
P(q2) = { σ4, σ6 }
P(q4) = { σ10 }
P(q1) = P(q3) = P(q5) = ∅
(37)
q0 q1
q2 q3
q4 q5
σ0
µ
σ1
σ2
σ3
σ4
µ
σ5
σ6µ σ7
σ8
σ9 σ10
µ
Fig. 7. The plant G with the protection policy P
Fig. 7 illustrates the plant G with the protection policy
P. From P, the secret q5 is 2-securely reachable because all
strings from the initial state q0 reaching the secret state have
at least two protectable events. For example, in real systems,
protecting σ0 can be implemented by setting up a Wi-Fi
password for the wireless router. Additionally, protections
for σ4, σ6 and σ10 can be implemented by configuration of
user authentication in each of the servers q3 and q5.
B. Three Protections
In this subsection, we demonstrate our solution for m-
SSMCP for the case m = 3. Consider again the plant G
in Example 3, and assume that the secret in G must be
protected by at least three protections, namely m = 3 of
m-SSMCP. The transitions in G which D0 and D1 specify
to disable are relabeled as follows:
δ′
D1
= { (q0, σ
′
0, q1), (q2, σ
′
4, q3), (q2, σ
′
6, q5), (q4, σ
′
10, q5) }
Next, the new plant G2 is depiceted in Fig. 8. After com-
q0 q1
q2 q3
q4 q5
σ′0
σ1
σ2
σ3
σ′4
σ5
σ′6 σ7
σ8
σ9 σ′10
Fig. 8. Plant G2
puting the specification automaton GK2 for G2 in the same
way as GK1 , let K = L(GK2) and call function RCMC1
in line 3 of Algorithm 2. When k = 0, 1, supC(K) = ∅.
When k = 2,
supC(K) = (σ′0.σ1)
∗
So RCMC1 returns S2 with L(S2) = supC(K). Thus
Algorithm 2 returns nonempty supervisors S0, S1, S2. Ac-
cording to S2, the following is a control policy D2 for G2:
D2(q1) = { σ2, σ8 }
D2(q0) = D2(q2) = D2(q3) = D2(q4) = D2(q5) = ∅
Therefore, the merged control policy D for this example is
as follows, derived from D0, D1 and D2:
D(q0) = { σ0 }
D(q1) = { σ2, σ8 }
D(q2) = { σ4, σ6 }
D(q4) = { σ10 }
D(q3) = D(q5) = ∅
Finally, the solution for m-SSMCP (i.e. the protection
policy P) for this example is derived from D by the reverse
conversion:
P(q0) = { σ0 }
P(q1) = { σ2, σ8 }
P(q2) = { σ4, σ6 }
P(q4) = { σ10 }
P(q3) = P(q5) = ∅
q0 q1
q2 q3
q4 q5
σ0
µ
σ1
σ2
µ
σ3
σ4
µ
σ5
σ6µ σ7
σ8µ
σ9 σ10
µ
Fig. 9. The plant G with the protection policy P
Fig. 9 illustrates the plant G with the protection policy
P. From P, every string reaching the secret state q5 from
the initial state q0 has at least three protectable events, that
is, the secret is protected with at least three protections.
For example, protecting σ2 and σ8 can be implemented
with Authentication VLAN (IEEE 802.1X) [11] to prevent
users from accessing the prohibited network in real systems.
However, installing and configuring VLAN for the system
is generally much more difficult for network administrators
than setting connection passwords of the wireless router, or
than creating accounts for users in the servers.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced the problem of protecting secret
states in the system with at least m (≥ 1) protections and
minimum protection costs (m-SSMCP). This problem has
been formulated as finding a protection policy such that every
string reaching secret states from the initial state has at least
m protectable events, and the protection cost is minimum.
We have presented a solution algorithm form-SSMCP which
computes m supervisors. Finally, we have demonstrated our
solution with a network example.
In future work, we aim to investigate a situation where
secrets have different importance and administrators are
concerned with the balance between protection cost and
secret importance.
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